Abstract-Today's society has developed a reliance on networking infrastructures. Health, financial, and many other institutions deploy mission critical and even life critical applications on local networks and the global Internet. The security of this infrastructure has been called into question over the last decade. In particular, the protocols directing traffic through the network have been found to be vulnerable. One such protocol is the Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) protocol. This paper proposes a security extension to OSPF containing a decentralized certificate authentication scheme (DecentCA) that eliminates the single point of failure/attack present in current OSPF security extensions. An analysis of the security of the DecentCA is performed.
I. INTRODUCTION
In today's society, the Internet is used to support a number of important services. Financial institutions use the Internet for online banking and trading. Consumers use it for purchasing goods and services. Companies with satellite offices use the Internet as part of their corporate network infrastructure. Clearly this global network infrastructure has grown to be a critical resource in the eyes of many in society today. Existing network layer security has not been widely used to protect these critical resources. This paper develops a decentralized security mechanism to protect network layer routing in the Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) routing protocol.
While the Internet infrastructure was designed to be extensible and reliable, the Internet and other networks like it were not originally constructed with security in mind [1] , [2] . In addition, the Internet's design actually makes it particularly vulnerable to malicious attack [3] . Much research today has focused on enforcing security from an application standpoint. For example, the secure socket layer (SSL) protocol provides end to end authentication and encryption to network based applications. One primary use for SSL is securing transactions on the world wide web. Users now have some confidence in the integrity and confidentiality of data being transported between applications.
Users may not, on the other hand, have confidence in the ability of the network infrastructure itself to securely deliver information to its proper destination [4] in the face of malicious attackers. Modern networks use a number of protocols to direct the flow of traffic from one endpoint to another. These protocols do occasionally support some sort of authentication to create trust between protocol participants. However, these security features are seldom used and are often insufficient to provide adequate protection.
A. Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) Protocol
OSPF is a major network routing protocol used in computer networks. A full treatment of the protocol is outside the scope of this paper. In summary a router participating in the protocol floods information about its directly attached links to every other router in the network. In this way, each router can compute the shortest path to any location using the flooded information [5] .
Security in OSPF version 2 is specified only for exchanges between neighboring routers [5] . This feature is implemented in many widely available routing platforms, including Cisco's IOS [6] , Foundry's enterprise class routers [7] , as well as the open source Quagga routing platform [8] . Three different approaches to insuring authenticity and integrity of routing messages between neighbors are specified in OSPF v2:
• None: No authentication or integrity assurance is used.
• Simple Password: A clear text password is transmitted between neighbors to insure authenticity of messages.
• Cryptographic Authentication: A keyed hash, or message authentication code (MAC) is transmitted to ensure authenticity and integrity. While authentication of neighbor exchanges is important and prevents foreign devices from suddenly appearing on the network, it does not prevent against insiders modifying flooded information. If a valid router becomes subverted or begins malfunctioning, it may flood incorrect data about its connected links, or it may modify information sent by other routers, or even impersonate other routers by originating data appearing to come from another router. This results in the poisoning of routing tables for other routers in the domain. A poisoned routing table is one that contains information that does not reflect the actual topology of the network.
An example of router table poisoning is illustrated in Figure 1 . Assume node A ordinarily communicates with node F through node C. If node D wishes to have access to that data, it could attempt to poison node A's routing table. In an OSPF network, node D could impersonate node C by initiating a link state update packet that appears to originate from C indicating link (C, F ) is unavailable. This would cause Routing table poisoning example. node A to reroute traffic destined for node F through node D, thereby giving node D access to this data. This scenario can occur because node A has no way of knowing the real source of the forged link state advertisement.
B. Current Proposals for OSPF Security Extensions
In order to overcome the need for end-to-end authentication of link state information, Murphy et al. [9] propose a protocol for signing link state updates flooded throughout the network. A certificate for the signing router, containing its public key and role in the routing infrastructure, is disseminated through the network in the same fashion as link state updates. This certificate is signed by a centralized certificate authority (CA). Each router in the OSPF routing area is configured with the public key of the CA. The CA's public key is used to verify the router certificate. Once the certificate is verified, the router's public key can be used to verify the origin and integrity of link state updates.
Although these extensions could solve many security problems, few implementations use digitally signed OSPF. While certainly not authoritative, it is interesting to note that of the three implementations mentioned above only the Foundry routers claim compliance with the OSPF digital signature specification. There are a number of possible reasons for this. Fundamentally, the relative lack of acceptance involves both implementation difficulties and cultural notions. The major implementation and cultural challenge is that the digital signature extension requires an established and centralized public key infrastructure. A centralized certificate authority is problematic for a few reasons:
• it provides a single point of failure and attack [10] , • it is not feasible for domains that cross organizational boundaries [11] that may not all trust each other, and • the culture of the Internet is generally opposed to any kind of centralized control. A decentralized certificate authority infrastructure can be used to secure network layer protocols such as OSPF.
C. Proposed System Benefits
This research defines a modification of the digital signature extension proposed by Murphy et al. [9] to provide a decentralized router certificate authentication scheme (DecentCA). This system has the following benefits:
• It eliminates the need for a centralized certificate authority. • A graph of the trust relationships between routers is used to identify correct public key bindings.
• A victim is able to directly identify its attacker(s). An analysis of the effects of modification on the security properties of the algorithm is also performed.
II. ALGORITHM DEVELOPMENT
This section describes the decentralized certificate authentication algorithm. DecentCA uses a number of concepts introduced in Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [12] . PGP can be used to authenticate email messages. Email is digitally signed by the sender using a private key, and the message can be verified by the receiver using the sender's public key. The public key is obtained either from the sender out of band or from a public key server.
DecentCA differs from PGP because it does not use a central key server(s). In PGP, all public keys are stored in a single key server and automatically copied to mirror key servers. In DecentCA, keys are dynamically distributed using the OSPF reliable flooding protocol. In this way, the entire network is collectively responsible for acting as the key server.
No single server provides a point of failure or attack.
A. Trust Graphs
Trust graphs are a fundamental concept in DecentCA and are very similar to the concept used in Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [12] . A trust graph T is a directed graph containing vertices and edges, (V T , E T ). Vertices are network nodes, such as routers and their associated public key. An edge from node s to node r is a digital signature of node r's identity to public key binding by s. This is a statement made by s asserting the value of r's public key.
Trust graphs can then be used to identify the public key of an entity in the graph by locating the node containing the entity's identity. For example, consider the graph shown in Figure 2 . When A receives a message signed by D, A first locates the node containing D's identity and retrieves the associated public key. Next A can discover if there exists a path from itself to D's node in the trust graph. A path in a trust graph is formed by first locating the nodes in the path and second by verifying each signature in the path. Because of the structure of the trust graph, each certificate in the path can be verified using the public key contained in the predecessor's certificate.
In this example one such path is (A, C, D). This path indicates that A has signed C's certificate, and C has signed D's certificate. If A trusts C, then A can verify C's signature of D's binding using C's public key.
However, A does not have to simply trust C. Device A can continue to look for other paths to D in the trust graph to validate the binding signed by C. In this example, another such path is (A, B, D). Device B signed the same binding that C signed. Device A can verify B's signature of D's binding using B's public key. Because this second path does not contain device C, device A can be confident that device C alone could not have forged the binding for D. More formally, 2 such independent paths are vertex-disjoint paths.
Through this path checking strategy, DecentCA is able to validate bindings between an identity and public key. As seen in this example, at least two independent paths are required in order to validate the correctness of a binding in the face of a single attacker. For this reason, DecentCA requires at least two vertex-disjoint paths between any two nodes.
This assumption is not unreasonable for well designed networks. A biconnected network will provide at least two separate paths between any two nodes. The redundancy added by this property ensures that no single node failure (or attack) can partition the network into two pieces.
B. OSPF Neighbor to Neighbor Authentication
DecentCA also depends on the OSPF neighbor to neighbor authentication scheme introduced in Section I-A. All communications between neighboring routers are validated using this scheme.
C. Decentralized Certificate Authentication
DecentCA can be divided into three stages: 1) Certificate generation and flooding 2) Trust database exchange 3) LSA validation
D. Certificate Generation and Flooding
During the certificate generation and flooding stage, a security association is established between neighboring routers. Each router generates a message containing its identity and public key. This message is verified by the neighboring router using its pre-configured knowledge of the originating router's public key. Once verified, the neighboring router digitally signs a certificate containing the originating router's public key and identity. This certificate is flooded to area routers. Pre-configured information need only include each neighbor's public key. This public key is exchanged out of band at the same time as the shared key used in neighbor to neighbor authentication previously discussed.
Given that:
• Router r has public key public r ,
• router s can encrypt a message m using its private key,
• routers r and l can decrypt the message m with s's public key,
• and routers r, s, and l have agreed upon a one-way hash function for a message m,
H(m)
certificate generation and flooding proceeds as follows (as illustrated in Figure 3 ): 1) When router r comes on line, it transmits its identity and public key to neighboring router s.
r + public r 2) When router s receives this message, it in turn transmits its identity and public key to r. s + public s 3) Router s verifies that r + public r matches the public key for r received out of band. If it does not, certificate generation is aborted. 4) Router r verifies that s + public s matches the public key for s received out of band. If it does not, certificate generation is aborted. 5) Router s generates a hash of r + public r and encrypts it using its private key.
6) Router r generates a hash of s + public s and encrypts it using its private key.
Router s floods a certificate containing r's identity, r's public key, and s's identity, followed by s's signature throughout the routing area.
r + public r + s + E s (H(r + public r )) 8) Router r floods a certificate containing s's identity, s's public key, and r's identity, followed by r's signature throughout the routing area.
9) Router l, being some router in the area not s, receives
and
10) Router l inserts the received data into its trust database.
E. Trust Database Exchange
At this point in DecentCA, all nodes in the network possess r's public key as well as r's signature of its neighbor's public keys. However, r does not possess public keys for nodes in the network other than its immediate neighbors. The trust database exchange stage ensures that when a new router r comes on line, it receives the existing trust information about the network. During this stage, r receives each neighbor's trust database and adds the new information to its own trust database.
Given that r has trust database T r and s has trust database T s , the exchange proceeds as follows: 1) Router s transmits T s to r.
2) Router r adds the information from T s to T r .
When a signed message is received, it includes the signer's identity. The receiver verifies that the signer's public key exists in its trust database, and that there exists a path from its own public key to the signer's public key in the trust graph.
Assuming l and r are routers in network G, and that r has public key public r , verification proceeds as follows:
1) Router l ensures that all neighbors have issued a certificate for l's public key. If this is not the case, the received LSA is marked as unverified and added to the database. However, unverified LSA's are not used in route calculation. When new certificates are received, an attempt is made to verify all unverified LSA's. 2) When l receives an LSA originating from r, l verifies that r ∈ V T and that there exists some path in its T from l to r. If this does not hold, the LSA is flagged as unverified. 3) Router l verifies that there exists no node r with public key public r different from public r . a) If this does not hold, l checks for the existence of disjoint paths p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n for n > 1 from l to r with public key public r in its T . i) If this holds, l uses public r to verify the LSA. ii) Otherwise, l uses public r to verify the LSA. LSA validation requires locating a public key with multiple paths from the source node to the destination node in the trust graph. Because certificates are generated for all neighbors in DecentCA, the trust graph takes on the exact topology of the physical network. Given the assumption of a biconnected network, the trust graph must also be biconnected. The first step in LSA verification ensures that all nodes issue certificates for all neighbors. If this is not the case, the affected node cannot verify any LSA's and is non-functional. This prompts immediate action by network administrators.
G. Certificate Revocation
An important part of any public key infrastructure is certificate revocation. In a standard centralized public key infrastructure, a certificate revocation list (CRL) is generated by the certificate authority. Entities wishing to authenticate certificates query the CRL for the presence of the certificate in question. In a decentralized public key infrastructure where no single certificate authority exists, this approach is not feasible.
A certificate is revoked in DecentCA by each party that originally signed the certificate in question. Each neighbor floods a certificate revocation message. This message includes the identity and public key being revoked signed by the device revoking the certificate. When this message is received by another device, the signature is checked. If the signature is valid, the certificate is removed from the trust database. However, This results in the revoked certificate becoming disconnected from the trust graph.
III. ATTACK MODELS
Validation of security protocols is a daunting task. Schneier [13] explains, No amount of beta testing can ever uncover a security flaw. The only way to have any confidence in the security of a system is over time, through expert evaluation. It is with this understanding that this research attempts to cover the major attack models discussed in the literature. It is not the intent of this research to attempt an exhaustive search of all possible attacks. From Schneier's statement such an undertaking is nearly impossible. It is hoped that this research will prompt the community to examine DecentCA for deficiencies and iteratively improve upon those deficiencies where found.
Elsewhere Schneier discusses threat modeling as one way to build confidence in the security of a system. Three threats, discussed by Huang et al. [14] , relating to link state routing are considered and illustrated in Figure 5 :
Router • Masquerading: Impersonating other routers • Substitution: Substituting valid information with falsified information • Insertion: Inserting information that makes false claims about networks to which a router is attached These attacks may be carried out under various circumstances. The attacker can either be an outsider or an insider. An outsider attack is undertaken by a router that has not been authorized to participate in the routing protocol. Outsider attacks are perpetrated by an individual who gains access to a link incident to authorized routers. OSPF routing packets can then be introduced directly into the network by the perpetrator. In addition, OSPF routing data is sent using the Internet Protocol (IP) and can conceivably originate anywhere on the Internet with a destination address of an authorized router.
An insider attack, on the other hand, is performed by a router that is authorized to participate in the routing protocol but was later subverted. This means the router knows the secret keys needed to perpetuate routing information beyond its immediate neighbors. Insider attacks can further be classified according to the following criteria:
• Number of attackers: Attacks can include single or multiple attackers.
• Relationship among attackers: Colluding attackers work together to undermine security efforts whereas noncolluding attackers work independently.
• Position: When attackers partition the network, all traffic crossing from one side of the network to the other must pass through attackers. However, when attackers do not partition the network, there is at least one path that does not pass through a malicious node. Figure 6 summarizes the different combinations of attacks. The remainder of this section contains a threat analysis of each attack.
To verify the effectiveness of DecentCA, a threat analysis of each attack model is performed.
A. Outsider Attacks
First, all outsider attacks may be considered together. Outsider attacks are thwarted by the OSPF neighbor to neighbor authentication when cryptographic authentication is used. Because the outsider, by definition, is not trusted by any router in the network, it does not know any of the secret keys used by participating routers. Once the forged routing data enters the routing domain, the first router to receive the information cannot verify the message using the scheme introduced in Section II-B. The message is then discarded. This holds true for all combinations of single or multiple colluding or noncolluding attackers.
B. Insider Attacks
Insider attacks take place when a router becomes subverted or malfunctions. This router is referred to as "malicious" whether it is subverted or malfunctioning. The malicious router may then introduce incorrect information into the routing domain. When no security measures are in place, this routing information, correct or incorrect, will be accepted by other routers in the routing area. If the OSPF cryptographic security between neighbors is employed, this information would still be accepted and forwarded because the malicious router has knowledge of the secret key used by its neighbors. Following is a discussion of other attack scenarios illustrated in Figure 5 .
1) Single Attacker -Masquerading: A masquerading attack undertaken by a single attacker r x occurs when r x floods information purported to originate from a router r 1 , not r x . This information must be signed by r 1 using private r1 in order to be validated by another router r k , using public r1 . However, r x does not know r 1 's private key and cannot sign a message that can be verified using r 1 's public key. Router r x must flood a forged version of r 1 's public key, public r1 for which it knows the private key private r1 . In addition, in order for this forged key to be linked into the trust database, it must be signed by some router already in the database. Because r x only knows its own private key, it must use this key to sign the forged key.
After flooding, each router's trust database contains two different versions of r 1 's public key, public r1 and public r1 . If this is not the case, r 1 must not be online, and each router's trust database only contains the forged key. If r 1 is not online, there is no harm accomplished by impersonating it. Given that r 1 is online, in order to determine which is the correct key, r k must first verify that there exists a trust path from r k to r 1 . If such a path does not exist containing one of these keys, the missing key can be discarded. However, as mentioned above, r x signed public r1 and assuming r x was already trusted (otherwise it would not be in the trust database) there does exist a trust path from r k to r 1 through r x that contains public r1 . In addition, because r 1 has already flooded its public key, there exists a trust path from r k to r 1 containing public r1 .
In this scenario, two keys exist, both of which appear to be trusted. At this point, two cases must be considered. If r x does not partition the network, there exist at least two paths between r k and r 1 . If so, there will also be at least two paths between r k and r 1 containing public r1 in the trust graph, given the assumption of at least two independent paths between any two nodes. However, because r x does not know any other router's private keys, there can only be a single trust path between r k and r 1 containing public r1 . The existence of multiple paths containing one key, and only a single path containing the other, uncovers the fact that public r1 must be forged.
In the second case r x partitions the network between r k and r 1 . In this case there only exists a single path from r k to r 1 and that path contains r x . This means that all traffic from r k to r 1 must pass through r x , and r x can corrupt all traffic between r 1 and r k no matter what security measures are in place.
For example, in Figure 7 (a) C wishes to masquerade as A to D. To begin with all public keys have been exchanged. Figure 7 (b) represents the trust graph as seen by node D. Each node in the graph is a certificate for the labeled node. Each edge in the graph is a signature of the destination node's certificate by the source node. Node D therefore possesses the correct public key for A. Node C could simply send a message purporting to originate from A. However, this message must be signed. Because C does not know A's public key, it cannot generate the correct digital signature for a message from A.
In order to be believed, C must forge a public/private key pair to D. To do this, node C floods a new public key for A for which it knows the associated private key. If C simply floods a new public key for A, the trust graph as seen by D would appear as in Figure 7 (c). Node A represents the forged public key for A. Because it has not been digitally signed by any nodes, it is disconnected from D's trust graph. If D ever receives a message signed by the certificate for A , it will not find a path to A in its trust graph. As a result, D cannot validate the message.
Router C is therefore forced to sign A with its own private key in order to link the forged public key for A into D's trust graph. Router D trust graph appears as shown in Figure 7(d) . When D receives a message signed by C using the forged public key for A, it can locate a path from itself to A in its trust graph. Note however, that it will also find the path to the correct public key for A. In fact, there are two paths to the correct public key for A: one path through B, and one path through C. Because this is assumed to be a biconnected network, D knows that the correct key will be reachable by at least two paths in the trust graph. In this way, D is able to decide that the correct key is the key contained in the certificate represented by node A and not the certificate represented by node A .
2) Single Attacker -Substitution: In a substitution attack, a single attacker r x attempts to modify, and continue flooding modified information originating from r 1 . Because the information being flooded has previously been signed using r 1 's private key, r x must generate a new signature for the modified information. However, because r x does not know r 1 's private key, it cannot generate a signature that can be validated using public r1 . Therefore, it must flood a forged version of r 1 's public key public r1 for which it knows the corresponding private key private r1 . At this point, the attack is the same as the masquerading attack in Section III-B1.
3) Single Attacker -Insertion: An insertion attack can take on one of two forms. First, a single attacker r x can insert information about a link, which does not exist, to another node r 1 . This attack is undertaken in order to re-route traffic destined for r 1 through r x . The goal of this attack is to eavesdrop on these conversations or to drop the data with the intent of disrupting communication.
Suppose r x advertises a link from r x to r 1 signed using public x . This advertisement is signed by a trusted key and will be accepted as valid. This creates a uni-directional link from r x to r 1 . Because the link does not really exist, r 1 would not generate an advertisement for this link, creating a bi-directional link in the area routers' link state databases. As a result, this link remains a uni-directional link in the area routers' link state databases. The OSPF specification states that only bi-directional links are included in routing calculations, and no computed route in OSPF includes the supposed link between r x and r 1 .
Further suppose that to overcome this problem, r x generates an advertisement for the link from r 1 to r x purported to have originated from r 1 . This is exactly the scenario presented in Section III-B1 and can be overcome by the technique presented there.
4) Multiple Independent Attackers: When multiple malicious routers exist and are working independently, all three attacks, masquerading, substitution, and insertion essentially become multiple instances of the individual attacks discussed above. This protocol addresses these problems as discussed above.
5) Multiple Colluding Attackers -Masquerading: If the multiple malicious routers are colluding, the masquerading attack proceeds as follows: routers r x1 , r x2 , . . . , r xi generate link state advertisements purported to originate from r 1 . Again, like the single attacker version, the advertisement that supposedly originates from r 1 must be signed with private r1 . Routers r x1 , r x2 , . . . , r xi do not know private r1 , so they must forge a public key public r1 for which they know the corresponding private key, private r1 . The forged key is flooded to the routers in the OSPF area. Each of the malicious nodes could generate, sign, and flood a certificate for this public key. This creates multiple trust paths from r k to r 1 containing public r1 in the area routers' trust databases since each of the r x 's is trusted (otherwise they would be outsiders).
After this flooding, each r k has two different versions of r 1 's public key, public r1 and public r1 . Because multiple attackers have signed certificates for public r1 , the decision of which key to accept becomes impossible. However, it is clear that the attack is detected due to the presence of two different public keys for the same identity. In addition, r k can narrow down the attacking routers to either the group that signed the certificate for public r1 (r x1 , r x2 , . . . , r xi ) or all routers that signed the certificate for public r1 . Furthermore, if r x1 , r x2 , . . . , r xi do not partition the network, r 1 will receive the certificate flooding for public r1 from all of the attacking routers. In this way, r 1 , the victim router, can determine the exact identity of the attackers. This information is invaluable to the administrator for r 1 or for an intrusion detection system as a tool to correct the problem.
6) Multiple Colluding Attackers -Substitution: For a substitution attack involving multiple, colluding attackers, routers r x1 , r x2 , . . . , r xi , attempt to modify and continue flooding falsified information originating from a single router, r 1 . Again as in the single case, a new signature must be generated for the modified information. Since r x1 , r x2 , . . . , r xi do not know the private key for r 1 , private r1 , they must originate a new public key for r 1 , public r1 . From this point on, the attack is exactly the same as discussed in Section III-B5, and the analysis performed for that case applies.
7) Multiple Colluding Attackers -Insertion: An insertion attack undertaken by multiple colluding routers takes on the following form: routers r x1 , r x2 , . . . , r x k , . . . , r xi collude to insert information about a link to another node r 1 , that does not exist in order to draw traffic through any one of the r x k 's. As in the single attacker scenario, such an advertisement is signed by r x k 's private key and found to be valid. However, since the link does not really exist, r 1 does not generate an advertisement for this forged link again resulting in a unidirectional link in the link state database of the area routers. This uni-directional link is not used in route calculations, and the attack is ineffective.
Suppose, however, that in order to overcome this, routers r x1 , r x2 , . . . , r x k , . . . , r xi flood a forged version of r 1 's public key, public r1 . From this point on, the attack and analysis is exactly the same as that found in Section III-B5. Table I compares three security technologies for OSPF. This first is simple cryptographic authentication. This approach authenticates messages between neighbors. If an outside attacker does not have know any router's shared key, all outsider messages will be rejected by the first router to receive the message. However, if the attacker has possession of the symmetric key of one of its neighbors (i.e., it is an insider) cryptographic authentication offers no protection. Digital signatures provide the highest level of security of the three. This is mainly due to its resilience to multiple, colluding attackers. In the digital signatures approach, a third party, the certificate authority, is responsible for binding each router's identity to its public key and signing a certificate asserting the binding. The difficulty with this approach is that the single certificate authority offers attackers a single point of vulnerability. By subverting the certificate authority, all security in the network is compromised. A subverted certificate authority can be used to revoke previously issued certificates and issue new certificates for which the attacker know the associated private keys. DecentCA provides a compromise between the digital signatures approach and the simple cryptographic authentication approach. While DecentCA does not provide the full security of a centralized CA, it does offer security for the attacks that are most likely to occur. Subverting a single router can be fairly simple, but subverting multiple routers may prove much more complicated. In addition, attacks that are not entirely protected against (such as those by multiple colluding attackers or attackers that partition the network) are either detected or partially defended against. For example, when an attacker can partition the network, communications between routers in the same partition remains secure.
IV. SECURITY COMPARISON
V. CONCLUSION This research presents an algorithm for distributing public keys used in the OSPF digital signatures infrastructure. The proposed algorithm, DecentCA, provides a decentralized certificate authentication system. Initially, public keys are certified by neighboring routers. These certificates are flooded through the network and stored. As part of the certificate chain verification, vertex disjoint paths in the trust database are used to verify the validity of certificates. Link state updates are signed by the originating routers and verified using the flooded certificates. In addition, an implementation of DecentCA has been created using the Quagga routing software suite and OpenSSL. This demonstrates the feasibility of implementing DecentCA.
DecentCA is novel as it does not rely on a central certificate authority to authenticate router certificates, thus overcoming the need to administer a central certificate authority. Second, it removes the single point of failure and attack present when a central certificate authority is used. DecentCA is shown to be robust in the face of single or multiple non-colluding attackers. In addition it is shown to detect attacks in the face of multiple colluding attackers. While not quite as strong as using a central certificate authority, the author believes that the benefits of decentralizing the security infrastructure and lowering the administrative overhead involved offset this weakness.
The advantage of DecentCA over the existing OSPF neighbor to neighbor security is clear from Table I . DecentCA offers increased security against insider attacks at a minimal increase in administrative overhead. OSPF Neighbor to Neighbor security requires the exchange of a symmetric key, and DecentCA requires the exchange of public keys at the same time. By offering this increase in security with minimal increase in administrative overhead, these security measures are easily adopted. In this way, the network as a whole becomes significantly more secure.
